Wait for a Warning Shot

The "wait for warning shot" approach suggests that we should continue AGI development as planned and only implement serious safety measures after we see clear evidence of catastrophic risk — essentially waiting for AGI to cause significant harm before taking action.

The reasoning is that until we see concrete proof of danger, we can't know what safety measures are needed or justify the costs of slowing development.

The appeal:

• Avoids the costs and coordination challenges of preventive measures
• Provides clear evidence to motivate safety action
• Allows continued rapid progress on beneficial AI capabilities
• Seems "reasonable" from a risk management perspective

Why this is catastrophically wrong:

• By the time they can kill millions, it will be too late: Once AGIs have the capability to cause mass casualties, they likely also have the capability to prevent us from implementing effective countermeasures.
• No second chances: Unlike other technologies where we can learn from failures and improve, an AGI "warning shot" that kills millions of people may be the last warning we ever get to respond to.
• Capability explosion: AGI capabilities can advance extremely rapidly once certain thresholds are crossed. The gap between "concerning but manageable" and "existentially dangerous" may be measured in days or weeks, not years.
• Irreversible consequences: Many potential AGI failures would cause irreversible damage to human civilization or the environment. There's no "undo" button for global catastrophes.
• Competitive dynamics: Even after a warning shot, the competitive pressures that created the dangerous AGI in the first place would still exist, making it difficult to implement effective safety measures.

Historical precedent:

This approach is like waiting for nuclear weapons to destroy a city before implementing nuclear safety protocols, or waiting for a pandemic to kill millions before developing public health measures. By the time the warning shot occurs, it's too late to prevent the catastrophe.

The fundamental error:

Waiting for a warning shot assumes we'll have the opportunity to learn and respond after AGI demonstrates catastrophic capability. But if AGIs can cause mass harm, they can also prevent our response — making the warning shot potentially the end of human agency rather than the beginning of effective safety measures.